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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On February 18, 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA), which expanded federal jurisdiction over class 
actions of national and interstate interest.1 CAFA essentially loosened 
the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 for class actions, requiring defendants to only show that (1) the 
class consists of at least 100 members, (2) a single member of the class 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (“The purposes of 
this Act are to . . . restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution 
by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction.”); Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 
457 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The [Senate Judiciary] Committee report said 
‘[o]verall, [CAFA] is intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over 
class actions. Its provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that 
interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any 
defendant.”’). 
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is a citizen of a state or foreign country different from any defendant 
(minimal diversity),2 and (3) the aggregated amount in controversy is 
at least $5,000,000.3 This differs from the ordinary basis of 
jurisdiction, requiring every plaintiff to be of different citizenship from 
every defendant (complete diversity)4 and further requiring every 
plaintiff to plead a good faith claim of at least $75,000.5 CAFA further 
eliminated removal requirements that mandate unanimous consent 
among defendants and place a one-year deadline to take such action.6 
Moreover, CAFA does not apply retroactively to cases filed before its 
enactment, effectively making it a substantive, rather than a 
procedural, measure.7 
 Despite the increased jurisdictional flexibility provided by 
CAFA, the Act has been touted as a measure of class action reform to 
prevent abuses, such as forum shopping by plaintiffs to maximize state 
bias against out-of-state defendants.8 Other concerns addressed by 
CAFA are adverse effects on interstate commerce resulting from states 
                                                 
2 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Article 
III [of the United States Constitution] poses no obstacle to the legislative extension 
of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are 
not co-citizens.”) (emphasis added). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). 
4 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267–68 (1806) (“The court 
understands [federal diversity jurisdiction] to mean that each distinct interest should 
be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the 
federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned 
in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts.”). 
5 Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir. 1974). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006). 
7 Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(CAFA jurisdiction requirements did not apply to case filed before enactment, even 
where plaintiffs amended the class definition after enactment); see also Meghan J. 
Dolan, Seventh Circuit Moves to the Head of the Class: Recent Decisions Provide a 
Broad Interpretation of Federal Jurisdiction Under CAFA, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 
1 ( 006), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/dolan.pdf. 2
80–81 (1st Cir. 2009) (“According to Congress, these abusive practices included 
forum shopping to take advantage of potential state court biases against foreign 
defendants.”). 
8 In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 75, 
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imposing their laws on citizens of other states by adjudicating suits of 
national significance.9 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Exceptions to CAFA Jurisdiction 
 
However, plaintiffs seeking to keep their suit in state court are 
not without remedy: under the home-state and local controversy 
exceptions, a federal district court must decline jurisdiction.10 The 
home-state exception provides that a federal district court must decline 
jurisdiction where (1) “two-thirds or more of the members of all 
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and (2) the primary 
defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
filed.”11  
Under the local controversy exception, a federal district court 
must decline jurisdiction where “greater than two-thirds of the 
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens 
of the State in which the action was originally filed” and there is at 
least one defendant “[1] from whom significant relief is sought . . . ; 
[2] whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and [3] who is a citizen of the 
State in which the action was originally filed.”12 In addition, the 
                                                 
9 Id. at 81 (“Congress in enacting CAFA was concerned that state courts were 
‘making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the 
rights of the residents of those states.’”); Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (“[Congress 
finds that] [a]buses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free 
flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by 
the framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are— 
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court; 
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants; 
and 
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the 
rights of the residents of those States.”). 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)–(B) (2006). 
11 Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).  
12 Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).  
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principal injuries of the plaintiff class must have occurred in the State, 
and there must have been no other class action asserting similar factual 
allegations filed against the defendants within the preceding three 
years.13  
Additionally, a federal district court may, at its discretion, 
choose to decline jurisdiction where “greater than one-third but less 
than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the 
aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which 
the action was originally filed” and where remand to state court would 
serve the interests of justice under the totality of the circumstances.14 
However, this exception is not discussed in this article. 
 
B. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standard for Establishing 
Two-Thirds State Citizenship 
 
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a party who establishes 
his or her domicile in a state simultaneously establishes his or her state 
citizenship.15 An individual originally establishes his or her place of 
birth as his or her domicile, and this domicile presumptively continues 
until the individual establishes (1) a new residence and (2) an intention 
to remain there.16  
For purposes of evaluating the two-thirds state citizenship 
requirement, most federal circuits have held that plaintiffs seeking to 
keep their case in state court under the home-state or local controversy 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Id. § 1332(d)(3).  
15 Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954) (“With respect to the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, citizenship has the same meaning as 
domicile. It imports permanent residence in a particular state with the intention of 
remaining, and is not dependent on birth. Residence alone is not the equivalent of 
citizenship, although the place of residence is prima facie the domicile; and 
citizenship is not necessarily lost by protected absence from home, where the 
intention to return remains.”). 
16 Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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exceptions bear the burden of proof.17 Indeed, this approach is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s general view on removal 
jurisdiction, allocating the burden to the party claiming an exception 
from jurisdiction.18 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ burden of proof is met by a 
preponderance of the evidence showing that two-thirds of the class 
members are individuals domiciled or corporations organized in the 
state.19 However, plaintiffs are not burdened with the gargantuan task 
of showing the citizenship of every individual class member.20 Rather, 
judicial economy dictates that this evidentiary standard is based on 
“practicality and reasonableness.”21 This burden of proof and 
                                                 
17 Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(following the Senate Judiciary Committee report, which states: “[I]t is the intent of 
the Committee that the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating 
that a case should be remanded to state court (e.g., the burden of demonstrating that 
more than two-thirds of the proposed class members are citizens of the forum state). 
Allocating the burden in this manner is important to ensure that the named plaintiffs 
will not be able to evade federal jurisdiction with vague class definitions or other 
efforts to obscure the citizenship of class members.”); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. 
Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2009); Kaufman v. 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2009); Preston v. Tenet 
Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston II), 485 F.3d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007); Evans v. Walter 
Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2006).  
18 Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003) 
(“[W]henever the subject matter of an action qualifies it for removal, the burden is 
on a plaintiff to find an express exception.”). 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c); In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 673 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he plaintiffs had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
two-thirds of their proposed class members are Kansas citizens”); Preston II, 485 
F.3d at 813–14 (“[T]he party moving for remand under the CAFA exceptions to 
federal jurisdiction must prove the citizenship requirement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”).  
20 Preston II, 485 F.3d at 816 (“From a practical standpoint, class action 
lawsuits may become ‘totally unworkable in a diversity case if the citizenship of all 
members of the class, many of them unknown, had to be considered.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
21 Id. 
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evidentiary standard is identical under the home-state, local 
controversy, and discretionary CAFA jurisdiction exceptions.22 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
 
 Recently, in In re Sprint Nextel Corporation, the plaintiffs 
brought suit for themselves and on behalf of the class of all Kansas 
residents who purchased text messaging services from the defendant, 
Sprint Nextel, over a three-year period.23 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Sprint Nextel “conspired with other cell phone providers to impose 
artificially high prices for text messaging service.”24 The plaintiffs 
specifically limited the class to those Kansas residents who (1) had a 
Kansas cell phone number and (2) received their cell phone bills at a 
Kansas mailing address.25 
 The defendant removed the action to the United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas under CAFA, providing evidence of 
five non-Kansan class members meeting the plaintiffs’ criteria, i.e., 
national corporations lacking state citizenship but subscribing to 
Kansas cell phone service and receiving their bills at Kansas mailing 
addresses.26 The Multi-District Litigation panel subsequently 
transferred this and over a dozen similar cases to the Northern District 
of Illinois.27 Thereafter, the plaintiffs successfully remanded the case 
to Kansas state court under the home-state exception of CAFA.28 The 
district court found that, despite providing no evidence of citizenship, 
the plaintiffs had narrowly “defined the putative class in such a way as 
                                                 
22 Id. at 812.  
23 Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d at 671. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. The plaintiffs presented a third limiting class factor as those who paid a 
long distance Kansas “USF fee,” but the court found this factor irrelevant. Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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to leave little doubt that at least two-thirds of the class members are 
Kansas citizens.”29  
On the defendant’s appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
rejected the contention that the plaintiffs’ proposed class met the two-
thirds citizenship requirement of the home-state exception.30 Although 
the court agreed that in-state cell phone numbers and mailing 
addresses provided evidence of an extended stay in Kansas by class 
members, it was questionable whether all such individuals actually 
intended to remain in the state as citizens because many of those 
individuals were potentially out-of-state college students or military 
personnel.31 Indeed, being a resident of a state is not equivalent to 
being a domiciliary.32  
 Yet, despite its ruling, the court acknowledged the appeal of 
drawing the inference that a class of individuals maintaining in-state 
cell phone numbers and mailing addresses are citizens of the state, 
particularly noting that the largest military base and largest university 
in Kansas contained only 10,000 members each, as compared to 
Kansas’s total population of 2.8 million33:  
 
[O]ne would think that the vast majority of individual 
Kansas cell phone users do in fact live in that state and 
that the vast majority of them view it as their true 
home. True, some of those residents are college 
                                                 
29 Id.; see In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08 C 7082, 09 C 2192, 
2009 WL 2488301, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2009), vacated by Nextel Corp. 593 
F.3d 669 (“Though undoubtably some members of the putative class are individuals 
who, since January 2005, have moved away from Kansas or are out-of-state college 
students who do not intend to reside in Kansas permanently, those facts do not alter 
the reality that plaintiffs have defined the putative class in such a way as to leave 
little doubt that at least two-thirds of the class members are Kansas citizens.”). 
30 Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d at 674. 
31 Id. at 673–74. 
32 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) 
(“Domicile is not necessarily synonymous with residence, and one can reside in one 
place, but be domiciled in another.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
33 Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d at 674. 
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students from other states or others, such as soldiers, 
who come to Kansas without the intent to remain 
indefinitely. But it’s hard to believe that those 
nondomiciliaries are collectively more than a drop in 
the bucket when it comes to class composition. The 
population of Kansas is approximately 2.8 million 
people, . . . but the state’s biggest military base, Fort 
Leavenworth, is home to only 10,000 soldiers and 
family members, . . . and the out-of-state population of 
the University of Kansas, the state’s biggest school is 
under 10,000 . . .34 
 
The court also considered it unlikely that a substantial number 
of businesses providing Kansas cell phone numbers to their employees 
and receiving the bills in Kansas would be out-of-state companies; a 
business would presumably have billing items sent to the 
“administrative head,” a strong candidate for the company’s principal 
place of business.35  
 Nonetheless, the court found the plaintiffs’ class definition 
insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that two-
thirds of class members were Kansas citizens, broadly stating, “we 
agree with the majority of district courts that a court may not draw 
conclusions about the citizenship of class members based on things 
like their phone numbers and mailing addresses.”36 In so holding, the 
Seventh Circuit has substantially hampered plaintiffs’ ability to remain 
in state court, removing the common sense approach that several other 
courts have taken by requiring additional evidence of citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Id. at 673–74 (citations omitted). 
35 Id. at 674. 
36 Id.  
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III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S SOLUTIONS 
 
A. Tailoring Class Definitions 
 
Other courts have held that plaintiffs may freely tailor their 
class definitions to fit within a CAFA exception and avoid federal 
jurisdiction,37 at least under CAFA’s home-state and local controversy 
exceptions.38   
 In re Hannaford Brothers Company Consumer Data Security 
Breach Litigation specifically addressed the rationale behind allowing 
plaintiffs to carve out definitions defeating CAFA jurisdiction.39 First, 
by defining class members as state citizens, or “narrowing their 
pleadings” to fit within an in-state exception, plaintiffs potentially 
decrease the size of their class and consequently, total damages and 
settlement leverage.40 Second, by keeping their suit in state court, 
plaintiffs also potentially sacrifice claims and legal theories that are 
exclusively available in federal courts.41 Third, the home-state 
exception (which requires the primary defendants to be state citizens) 
and the local controversy exception (which requires that one defendant 
be a state citizen from whom significant relief is sought) minimize the 
potential out-of-state bias against defendants by requiring defendants 
to have significant presence in the state.42 Likewise, the requirement 
                                                 
37 In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 75, 
77 (1st Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 2008). 
38 In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 592 F. Supp. 
2d 146, 148 n.3 (D. Me. 2008) (“There is one section of CAFA that encourages the 
court in some instances to prevent a plaintiff from circumventing federal jurisdiction 
(instructing the federal court to consider ‘whether the class action has been pleaded 
in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdi tion,’ c
on
39 In re Hannaford Bros., 564 F.3d at 80–81.   
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(C), but 
it does not apply to subsection (4), the provisi  applicable here.)”). 
40 Id. at 80. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 80–81 (“According to Congress, these abusive practices included 
forum shopping to take advantage of potential state court biases against foreign 
defendants. But where, as here, the defendant is also a citizen of the forum state, the 
concern for bias simply does not arise.”) (citations omitted).   
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of both the home-state and local controversy exceptions, that two-
thirds of class members are citizens of the state, reduces the concern
that state courts “mak[e] judgments that impose their view of the law
on other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States
because potentially only one-third of class members are citizens of 
other states.
 
 
,” 
                                                
43 Lastly, Congress is free to amend or create legislation if 
class definition tailoring to the home-state and local controversy 
exceptions creates an “undesirable loophole.”44   
 However, courts in the Sixth Circuit have disallowed 
complaint tailoring to defeat CAFA jurisdiction where they found “no 
colorable basis . . . other than to frustrate CAFA.”45 For instance, in 
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc., the plaintiffs sought to 
undercut CAFA’s $5 million amount in controversy requirement and 
avoid federal jurisdiction by splitting their claims for injury into five 
separate suits covering five sequential time periods, each suit claiming 
only $4.9 million in damages.46 The Sixth Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs could not arbitrarily split their claims by time period in order 
to remain below the $5 million amount in controversy requirement of 
CAFA while retaining the practical benefit of an aggregated claim of 
$24.5 million.47 In so holding, the court laid down the general rule that 
“where recovery is expanded, rather than limited, by virtue of 
splintering of lawsuits for no colorable reason, the total of such 
identical splintered lawsuits may be aggregated.”48 
 Similarly, in Proffit v. Abbott Laboratories, the plaintiffs 
sought to circumvent federal jurisdiction by splitting their antitrust 
claims into eleven suits, each claiming $4,999,000 in damages and 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 80.   
45 Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-151, 2008 WL 4401367, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 23, 2008). 
46 Freeman, 551 F.3d at 406. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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covering different time periods.49 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee found the plaintiffs’ division of the suits an 
arbitrary exercise for avoiding federal jurisdiction by undercutting 
CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement, while retaining an 
aggregate potential damages award of $54,989,000.50 In finding that 
the plaintiffs’ efforts were motivated purely by avoiding federal 
jurisdiction, the court noted that the named plaintiff and defendant 
were the same in each suit, and that each of the eleven complaints 
contained allegations concerning the entire scope of defendant’s 
conspiracy.51 
 By contrast, in Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co.,52 the Ninth 
Circuit rejected aggregation of seven separate state tort claims against 
one manufacturer into a “mass action”53 as a basis for removal to 
federal court where each suit contained less than 100 class members, 
thereby undercutting CAFA’s numerosity requirement.54 The court 
expressly distinguished Freeman and Proffitt on the basis that in those 
cases, class members overlapped among the separated suits, and such 
overlapping members (i.e., members who were part of more than one 
suit) stood to gain in excess of the amount in controversy required 
under CAFA.55 
                                                 
49 Proffitt, 2008 WL 4401367, at *1–2. 
50 See id. at *2. 
51 Id. (“The only difference among the eleven lawsuits filed by plaintiff is the 
time period each is alleged to cover. The plaintiff and defendant are the same in each 
case, and it is clear to the court that the allegations cover one antitrust conspiracy 
concerning the same drug, TriCor. . . . [E]ach complaint contains allegations 
concerning the entire scope of the alleged conspiracy during various time periods 
throughout the full decade. . . . Other than the difficulty of making a damages 
disclaimer to avoid the CAFA, there appears no reason for selecting the one-year 
divisions and creating eleven lawsuits to litigate one conspiracy that involves one 
defendant and one drug.”). 
52 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009). 
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2006). 
54 Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 956. 
55 Id. at 955 (“The concerns animating Freeman and Proffitt simply are not 
present in this case, as none of the seven groups of plaintiffs has divided its claims 
into separate lawsuits to expand recovery. To the contrary, each of the seven state 
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Alternatively, rather than splitting claims arbitrarily by time, as 
in Freeman and Proffitt, plaintiffs might have simply claimed an 
amount less than $5,000,000.56 However, defendants could have 
rebutted such a claim to remove to federal court by showing that 
plaintiffs’ claims were “more likely than not” to meet CAFA’s 
minimum amount in controversy.57 
These cases indicate that, if the practical results are that 
plaintiffs retain the benefit of claiming an award surpassing CAFA’s 
$5 million amount in controversy requirement, they may not tailor 
their complaints to avoid federal jurisdiction.58 However, plaintiffs 
have had success defining their class to include members with other 
indications of citizenship. Several options for circumscribing class 
definitions are available as courts consider a multitude of factors in 
determining domicile including “[1] voting registration and practices; 
[2] location of personal and real property; [3] location of brokerage 
and bank accounts; [4] location of spouse and family; [5] membership 
in unions and other organizations; [6] place of employment or 
business; [7] driver’s license and automobile registration; and [8] 
payment of taxes.”59 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
court actions was brought on behalf of a different set of plaintiffs, meaning that none 
of the plaintiff groups stands to recover in excess of CAFA’s $5 million threshold 
between the seven suits.”) (emphasis in original). 
56 See Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“A disclaimer in a complaint regarding the amount of recoverable damages 
does not preclude a defendant from removing the matter to federal court upon a 
demonstration that damages are ‘more likely than not’ to ‘meet the amount in 
controversy requirement,’ but it can be sufficient absent adequate proof from 
defendant that potential damages actually exceed the jurisdictional threshold.”). 
57 Id. 
58 See Tanoh, 561 F.3d 945 at 966; Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 
551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008); Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-151, 2008 
WL 4401367, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008).  
59 Kyung Park v. Holder, 572 F.3d 619, 1301 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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1. Defining Class by Citizenship 
 
To cure the plaintiffs’ evidentiary woes, the Nextel court 
suggested that the plaintiffs simply define their class as all Kansas 
citizens who subscribed to the cell phone service of Nextel and 
received their bills in Kansas.60 Indeed, such a class description 
requires, by definition, no evidence at all to establish the requisite 
proportion of citizenship.61 At least two other circuits have allowed 
plaintiffs to define their members as citizens to defeat CAFA 
jurisdiction.62 
However, the drawback to plaintiffs is that such a class 
definition reduces the total pool of members and consequently, 
recoverable damages from the suit.63 Although such a class definition 
establishes with 100% certainty that all members of the class are 
citizens of the state, attorneys would be hesitant to limit their 
recoverable pool to this level when they could obtain a larger fee 
recovery by certifying a class potentially composed of one-third non-
citizens.64  
 
2. Defining Class Members by Residence 
 
Pennsylvania courts have adopted reasoning similar to that of 
the Seventh Circuit. In Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., the district court 
                                                 
60 In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 676 (7th . 2010).  Cir
61 See Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 937–38 (4th Cir. 2008); see 
also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 
146, 148 n.2 (D. Me. 2008) (“Since the class by definition is limited to citizens of 
Florida, there is no need for evidence as to what percentage of the class is Florida 
citizenry.”).   
62 See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 
75, 77 (affirming district court decision that class defined to include only Florida 
citizens established that two-thirds of the class members were citizens of the state); 
Johnson, 549 F.3d at 937. 
63 Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d at 676. 
64 Id. (“The tradeoff is that this definition would have limited the pool of 
potential class members, something that plaintiffs and their lawyers are apparently 
unwilling to do.”). 
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rejected the reasoning that residence is sufficient to establish that two-
thirds of a putative class are domiciliaries of the state.65 The plaintiffs’ 
class was defined as “[a]ll persons and entities residing or doing 
business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who subscribed to 
Comcast’s high-speed internet service” over an approximately one-
year period.66 Solely addressing the residential subscribers,67 the court 
found that a subscription to Internet service is not indicative of an 
intent to remain in the state, providing the example of college students 
who attend Pennsylvania colleges intermittently.68 The court reasoned 
that Internet service is merely a “standard necessity” in homes and 
does not indicate domiciliary intent any more so than do “telephone, 
electric, cable, gas, water and other services.”69 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court also cited a Third Circuit case, Krasnov v. Dinan, 
where the court stated that one’s place of residence serves as prima 
facie evidence of domicile, but is not sufficient by itself to establish 
domicile.70 
Additionally, the court found that Internet subscribers “doing 
business” in the state likely encompassed a substantial group of non-
citizens (and non-residents),71 e.g., out-of-state commuters or Internet 
                                                 
65 No. Civ. A. 05-2340, 2006 WL 487915, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2006) 
(“Absent evidence of any factor that bears on the class members’ intent to remain in 
Pennsylvania, [the court is] unable to determine the domicile of plaintiff’s residential 
class members.”) 
66 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
67 Id. at *5. Defendant Comcast did not dispute the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
98% of residential subscribers were Pennsylvania residents. Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. The transient nature of Internet subscription contracts was presumably 
also the reason that the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 86.5% of class 
members demonstrated intent to remain in the state by maintaining service for over 
five months. Id. 
70 Id.; Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Where one 
lives is prima facie evidence of domicile, . . . but mere residency in a state is 
insufficient for purposes of diversity.”). 
71 Schwartz, WL 487915 at *6 (“Schwartz appears to assume that only class 
members who subscribe to Comcast’s nonresidential internet service in Pennsylvania 
could be considered to be Comcast internet subscribers that are ‘doing business’ in 
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subscribers.72 This was certainly a valid concern and probably 
sufficient alone for the court to deny remand to state court.  
 This conclusion is not outside the norm, as residence has never 
been equated to domicile or citizenship for diversity jurisdiction 
purposes.73 However, residence has often been accepted as prima facie 
evidence of domicile.74  
The term prima facie by legal definition describes evidence 
establishing a rebuttable presumption that what is asserted is true.75 In 
fact, at common law, a prima facie showing has almost always been 
established where a plaintiff shows that his or her claim is more likely 
than not to be true. For instance, in Allavi v. Ashcroft, an Afghan alien 
moving to reopen removal proceedings under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), failed to meet the required prima 
facie showing that he was “more likely than not” going to be tortured 
if removed.76 In People v. Hood, the Illinois Supreme Court used the 
“more likely than not” test to determine whether the prosecutor’s 
prima facie case had been made, where the prosecutor alleged the 
defendant had maintained possession of a firearm because it was found 
in his car.77 In State v. Watson, the Connecticut Supreme Court also 
applied the “more likely than not” test to determine whether a prima 
facie showing of possessing a gun had been made where the gun was 
                                                                                                                   
Pennsylvania. Because of this assumption, Schwartz fails to address the millions of 
Comcast internet subscribers across the nation that are not Pennsylvania citizens and 
could be considered to be ‘doing business’ in Pennsylvania.”). 
72 Id. at *4 (“Comcast also asserts that there are approximately 200,000 citizens 
of other states who are ‘doing business’ in Pennsylvania by commuting to work in 
Pennsylvania and countless numbers of citizens from other states who are ‘doing 
business’ with Pennsylvania via the internet.”). 
73 See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1301. 
74 Id. at 1300. 
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“prima facie, adj. Sufficient to 
establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted”).  
76 Allavi v. Ashcroft, 109 F. App’x 935, 936 (9th Cir. 2004). 
77 People v. Hood, 276 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1971). 
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found in defendant’s car.78 In Saunders v. State, the Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting possession of Molotov 
cocktails as constitutional because a possessor of Molotov cocktails 
was “more likely than not” intent on causing harm, thereby providing 
prima facie evidence of an intent to cause harm.79 In Sanderson v. 
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., the Court held that in 
personal injury cases, a prima facie showing of causation must be 
established by competent expert testimony establishing that the 
defendant’s conduct was more likely than not the cause of the injury.80 
Similarly, a prima facie case for tort damages arising from food 
poisoning requires a showing that it is more likely than not that the 
food’s condition caused the injury.81 
What this demonstrates is that prima facie has often been 
synonymous with a showing that a fact is “more likely than not” to be 
true. Although a preponderance of the evidence standard has been the 
norm at common law in determining whether an individual was 
domiciled in a state,82 residence has traditionally been insufficient to 
establish domicile83 (indeed, it is only one of two elements required), 
despite it serving as prima facie evidence of domicile.84 Were 
residence deemed sufficient to establish domicile and citizenship for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, domicile and citizenship would be 
rendered meaningless.  
Accordingly, many courts have applied a rebuttable 
presumption of domicile once residency is established.85 However, 
                                                 
78 State v. Watson, 345 A.2d 532, 542–43 (Conn. 1973). 
79 Saunders v. State, 275 A.2d 564, 565 (Del. 1971). 
80 Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 984 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996). 
81 Foster v. AFC Enters., Inc., 896 So. 2d. 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2005).  
82 Lyon v. Glaser, 288 A.2d 12, 22 (N.J. 1972) (“[T]he State must establish the 
status of taxability, I.e., domicil [sic] by the preponderance of the credible 
evidence.”). 
83 Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972). 
84 Id. 
85 District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 (1941); Sligh v. Doe, 
596 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1979); Fort Knox Transit v. Humphrey, 151 F.2d 602, 
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many courts have not accepted residence as independently sufficient to 
establish this presumption. For instance, in Preston v. Tenet 
Healthsystem Memorial Medical Center, Inc. (hereinafter Preston I), 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant infirmary failed to maintain 
safe conditions on the premises and to provide adequate transportation 
to safety during Hurricane Katrina.86 While the plaintiffs provided no 
evidence to show that at least two-thirds of the class was composed of 
Louisiana citizens, the defendants provided an affidavit from the 
director of medical records, indicating that 242 of 299 class members 
registered Louisiana as their primary residence.87 The court refused to 
apply the rebuttable presumption of evidence on the basis of “presence 
in the state” alone, suggesting that the plaintiffs should have produced 
additional evidence showing, for example, “vehicle registration or an 
extended period of residency and employment in Louisiana prior to the 
forced evacuation prompted by Hurricane Katrina.”88 Elaborating on 
its refusal to presume citizenship where only residence was shown, the 
court stated: 
 
The cases cited [by the court] undeniably incorporate 
language amenable to an argument that the court may 
determine citizenship based solely on evidence of 
residency, but [the defendant] fails to appreciate that in 
these lawsuits, the moving party did not ultimately 
prevail just because the opposing party offered no 
rebuttal evidence. Instead, the court considered the 
entire record to determine whether the evidence of 
residency was simultaneously sufficient to establish 
citizenship . . . [The defendant’s] proposed approach 
for determining citizenship gives undue attention to the 
naked statements of law as opposed to the substance of 
                                                                                                                   
602 (6th Cir. 1945); Kelleam v. Md. Cas. Co. of Balt., Md., 112 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 
1940); Bair v. Peck 738 F.Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Kan. 1990). 
86 Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem. Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston I), 485 F.3d 
793, 796 (5th Cir. 2007). 
87 Id. at 798. 
88 Id. at 800. 
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the relevant opinions. Based on the record, which 
includes only the primary billing addresses of the 
hospitalized patients, [the defendant] still fail[s] to 
establish the type of residency information reviewed in 
other circuits employing the presumption that a 
person’s residency forms an adequate basis for 
inferring citizenship unless contested with sufficient 
evidence.89 
 
 However, the cases cited by the plaintiffs, to which the court 
refers, all concerned citizenship outside the context of CAFA where 
the parties’ citizenship needed to be individually determined for all 
parties.90 As will be discussed below, statistically speaking, the burden 
of citizenship to be proven under CAFA is substantially less. 
Nonetheless, courts have more often than not been strict in applying a 
rebuttable presumption of domicile where residence is proven. 
 
3. Defining Class by Residence and Property Ownership 
 
Some district courts have found residence and property 
ownership in the state sufficient to indicate that two-thirds of a 
plaintiff class were citizens of the state. In Joseph v. Unitrin, Inc., the 
court found an action brought “individually and on behalf of all 
similarly situated Texas residents,” with a class defined as all 
policyholders who paid premiums to a Texas-based insurance 
company for residential insurance coverage, sufficient to establish that 
two-thirds of the class were citizens of Texas.91 The court relied on the 
theory that evidence of one’s residence is prima facie proof of one’s 
domicile,92 finding there was “no indication of a mass exodus” from 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 800 (citing Sligh, 596 F.2d at 1171; Fort Knox Transit, 151 F.2d at 
602; Kelleam, 112 F.2d 940). 
91 No. 1:08-CV-077, 2008 WL 3822938, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2008). 
92 Id. at *5 (citing Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). 
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Texas by more than one-third of these purported residents.93 The court 
further found that these policy owners were also likely to own homes 
in the state.94 
A similar story played out in Caruso v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
where, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a Louisiana district court 
found that a class, including all Louisiana homeowners who purchased 
insurance policies from the defendant insurance companies, could be 
reliably presumed to be comprised of at least two-thirds Louisiana 
citizens.95 However, the plaintiffs’ class definition was not expressly 
limited to residents, so the court construed the homeowner’s insurance 
policy as both evidence of residence and intent to remain in the state.96 
While this evidence of residence does not establish a class of 100% 
residency (as a class definition limited to state residents would) 
because a group of non-resident home owners may exist (e.g., 
members owning homes in multiple states and residing outside of 
Louisiana), the unique circumstances of Hurricane Katrina justify a 
departure from the stricter norm.97 
                                                 
93 Id. at *6. 
94 Id. (“As these policies cover both the policyholder’s residence and 
household effects, it can be assumed that members of the putative class own both 
real and personal property in Texas.”). 
95 469 F. Supp. 2d 364, 368 (E.D. La. 2007). 
96 Id. at 367 (“Given that no one disputes that Hurricane Katrina wrecked [sic] 
havoc on immovable property in Louisiana, the plaintiffs’ assertion that they 
represent a class of individuals covered by homeowner's policies for homes that are 
located in Louisiana creates a reliable presumption that this is a class of Louisiana 
residents. Indeed, owning a home is an indicium of domicile.”). 
97 Id. at 368. Obviously, those members forced out of residence by the events 
of Katrina are forgiven, because “it is reasonable to assume that residents of these 
parishes might change their addresses in the immediate aftermath of the storm 
without changing their domiciles.” Id. In fact, a class definition limiting members to 
actual (remaining) Louisiana residents in this case would decrease the class size 
because the harm, by its nature, caused or forced class members out of their 
residence. See id. Rather, the court’s common sense consideration of Hurricane 
Katrina and use of homeowner policy possession as evidence of class members’ 
residential intent allows for a larger class of “would be” residents. See id. 
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The Joseph and Caruso rulings have been interpreted 
narrowly, such that homeownership and residence may be taken as 
sufficient evidence of domicile, but residence alone may not. For 
instance, in Phillips v. Severn Trent Environmental Services, Inc., the 
district court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that a class, defined as 
persons affected by allegedly hazardous drinking water and who were 
residents or occupants of a Louisiana apartment complex between 
May 15, 2007, and May 20, 2007 (less than one week), met the two-
thirds citizenship requirement.98 The plaintiff had failed to offer any 
evidence demonstrating domiciliary intent, and the class period had 
included only the brief month of May 2007.99 Indeed, renters of an 
apartment, especially over such a shortly defined period of time, 
would be more likely to have only a transient presence in the state than 
homeowners.  
 
4. Defining Class as Employees in the State 
 
 In Mattera v. Clear Channel Communications, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found the 
local controversy exception’s two-thirds citizenship requirement was 
met where the plaintiff class was defined as “all persons who worked 
for defendants as sales representatives at one of the New York radio 
stations and had their wages deducted at any time after March 9, 2000 
to entry of judgment of this case.”100 The court required no further 
evidence and found it “reasonably likely that more than two-thirds of 
the putative class members of the proposed class—all of whom 
work[ed] in New York—[were] citizens of New York.”101 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 No. 07-3889, 2007 WL 2757131, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2007). 
99 Id. 
100 Mattera v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (emphasis added). 
101 Id. at 80.  
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B. Representative Samples 
 
In addition to showing state citizenship by refined class 
definitions, the Nextel court suggested that future plaintiffs can meet 
their burden of proof for showing that state citizens comprise two-
thirds of the class by providing representative samples of class 
members indicating domiciliary intent, e.g., affidavits or survey 
responses from potential class members.102  
However, this solution is not without difficulties because 
plaintiffs may tailor their samples in a biased manner to achieve 
favorable results. For instance, in Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected an affidavit provided by the plaintiffs’ 
attorney attempting to show that because 93.8% of the class members 
were Alabama residents, two-thirds of the plaintiff class were likely 
citizens of Alabama.103 Although the plaintiffs’ sample was large, 
containing 10,118 potential class members, the court was skeptical of 
its neutrality because the affidavit made no mention of how the 
potential class members were selected.104 More specifically, the 
plaintiffs were seeking to certify a class containing two types of class 
members: (1) injured individuals who were owners, lessees, or 
licensees of property on which the defendants “deposited waste 
substances” and (2) individuals who were injured by simply coming in 
contact with the defendants’ waste substances.105 Fatally, the plaintiffs 
did not state which class member “type” was predominantly present in 
the sample or even the class:  
 
We do not know if these 10,118 people represent both 
the property damage and personal injury classes. We do 
not know if [the plaintiffs’ attorney’s] method favored 
people currently living in Anniston over people who 
have left the area. In short, we know nothing about the 
                                                 
102 In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2010). 
103 449 F.3d 1 59, 1166 (11th Cir. 2006). 1
105 Id. at 1165–66. 
104 Id. 
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percentage of the total class represented by the 10,118 
people on which plaintiffs’ evidence depends. 
Moreover, the class, as defined in the complaint, is 
extremely broad, extending over an [eighty-five]-year 
period. We do not know if [plaintiff’s attorney] made 
any effort to estimate the number of people with claims 
who no longer live in Alabama.106  
 
 Presumably, resident property owners, lessees, and licensees 
are more likely to be domiciliaries of the state, while those who were 
simply harmed by the toxic substances—but do not own, lease, or 
license property—are more likely to have only a transient presence in 
the state. In short, the lack of information provided by the plaintiffs in 
selecting individuals for their sample was interpreted suspiciously by 
the court for lack of neutrality.107  
 However, other courts have accepted facially unreliable 
evidence. In Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Memorial Medical Center 
(hereinafter Preston II), a case endorsed by the Nextel court,108 the 
Fifth Circuit also addressed the question of how much evidence is 
necessary to establish that two-thirds of potential class members are 
citizens of the state, in a class action brought for damages sustained 
during the Hurricane Katrina disaster.109 There, the plaintiffs harmed 
by incidents of Katrina alleged that their hospital failed to maintain 
emergency power in its facilities and to develop an evacuation plan for 
patients.110 The plaintiffs argued that two-thirds of the class was 
comprised of Louisiana citizens by producing affidavits showing that 
only seven of 256 admitted patients were registered as residents of 
states other than Louisiana and that two out of thirty-five deceased 
                                                 
106 Id. at 1166. 
107 Id. 
108 In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Preston 
II as an example of a case properly producing a “representative sample” for evidence 
of citizenship). 
109 Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston II), 485 F.3d 
804, 823–24 (5th Cir. 2007). 
110 Id. at 815. 
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patients had given out-of-state addresses.111 To show domiciliary 
intent, plaintiffs provided eight affidavits from class members 
indicating that they intended to return and remain in Louisiana.112   
First, the defendants attempted to rebut the plaintiffs’ evidence 
of residence by tracing the mailing addresses of potential class 
members located throughout the country through a private 
investigator, who found that forty-nine of 146 individuals identified as 
potential class members—slightly greater than one-third—resided 
outside of Louisiana, thus implying that less than two-thirds of the 
class were Louisiana residents.113 Following the district court’s 
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants’ rebuttal evidence 
because it failed to show these class members intended to remain 
outside of Louisiana.114  
The defendants then attempted to discredit the plaintiffs’ 
affidavits of domiciliary intent by arguing that they were subjective.115 
However, the court found the subjective nature of the affidavits 
unavailing, because the defendants failed to produce objective 
evidence showing that the plaintiffs had misrepresented their 
intentions: “This court gives little weight to statements of intent 
evidence, however, only when the subjective evidence conflicts with 
the objective facts in the record. [The defendants] point[] to no 
objective evidence in the record indicating that the affidavits 
misrepresented the plaintiffs’ intent of returning to New Orleans.”116 
Under this standard, requiring rebuttal of subjective statements of 
domiciliary intent by objective evidence, defendants would be 
foreclosed from countering with similar class member affidavits of 
subjective intent to remain outside of the state.117 Defendants’ burden 
                                                 
111 Id.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 816. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
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of rebuttal is thus not equal to plaintiffs’ burden of proof; it is far 
greater.118 
In retrospect, it is not only troubling that the Fifth Circuit 
accepted a minuscule sample size of eight members—the smaller the 
sample size, the less probative the evidence119—but also that six of the 
eight affidavits were produced by named class representatives.120 As 
opposed to unnamed class members, class representatives are often 
compensated for their service to the class through monetary 
incentives.121 These awards are offered to class representatives as 
recognition for the “financial or reputational risk undertaken in 
bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to 
act as a private attorney general.”122 Hence, class members have 
incentives to lie about things such as domicile,123 which, because of its 
subjective nature, is difficult to overturn or prove otherwise.124 In 
other cases, class representatives are little more than figureheads for 
litigation, with class counsel unilaterally directing the litigation.125  
Accordingly, the potential for fabrication and manipulation of 
                                                 
118 See id. 
119 Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Miss., 686 F.2d 1144, 1151 (5th Cir. 1982). 
120 Preston II, 485 F.3d at 815. 
121 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class 
Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2006) (noting 
that twenty-eight percent of class actions filed between 1993 nd 2002 included 
incentive awards to class representatives.) 
 a
122 Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009). 
123 See id. at 959. 
124 See Preston II, 485 F.3d at 816 (holding that subjective evidence of 
domiciliary intent is only undermined when it conflicts with objective facts). 
125 See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Class 
representatives must satisfy the court that they, and not counsel, are directing the 
litigation.”); Scott v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Plan, 224 F.R.D. 
353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the named plaintiff as inadequate to represent the 
class because of an “alarming lack of familiarity with the suit,” as indicated by the 
plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of allegations contained in the complaint, his meeting 
with counsel only once in three years, and his statement that “he would leave every 
decision up to his attorney and never question his advice”).  
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affidavits by either class representatives or their attorneys may 
undermine the credibility of affidavits of domiciliary intent.   
Despite the irksome aspects of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, the 
influence of the extreme circumstances of the Hurricane Katrina 
events on the court’s ruling should not go unnoticed: 
 
The underlying facts of this lawsuit and the reason for 
the parties contesting the citizenship issue emanate 
from a common origin of circumstances: the unmerciful 
devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. As an 
inevitable result of the property damage and 
evacuation, a great majority of the city’s population 
either temporarily or permanently relocated to habitable 
areas of Louisiana and other states. In this case, the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and attendant flooding 
serves as a common precipitating factor for the mass 
relocation pertinent to our citizenship determination 
and threads together the proposed class and many other 
citizens.126 
 
Hence, the court took note of the overall circumstances, and utilized 
common sense to draw the inference that at least two-thirds of the 
class members intended to remain in Louisiana, despite the plaintiffs’ 
paltry production of eight affidavits to establish domiciliary intent.127  
 The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
accepted similarly skewed evidence in Martin v. Lafon Nursing 
Facility of the Holy Family, Inc.128 The plaintiff filed a class action 
suit129 against a nursing home, accusing the defendant of negligence in 
                                                 
126  Preston II, 485 F.3d at 817. 
127 Id. 
128 548 F. Supp. 2d 268, 276 (E.D. La. 2008). 
129 Id. at 280. The class was defined as “[a]ll persons, except Defendants’ 
employees, who sustained injury and/or damage . . . as a result of unreasonable 
dangerous conditions and/or defects in and/or on the premises of LAFON on or 
about August 29, 2005, and/or as a result of the failure of LAFON to attain, 
maintain, and/or provide an adequate means of transportation to timely and/or safely 
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failing to protect the nursing home’s residents from the “effects” of 
Hurricane Katrina.130 In support of a motion to remand to state court 
via the home-state and local controversy exceptions, the plaintiff 
provided subjective evidence of domiciliary intent via questionnaire 
responses from class members.131 The questionnaires revealed that 
fifty-three of the sixty-eight class members (75%) who responded 
were citizens of Louisiana.132  Following the standard that the Fifth 
Circuit adopted in Preston II, the district court found the 
questionnaires sufficient to establish that two-thirds of the plaintiff 
class was comprised of Louisiana citizens because the defendant had 
not presented objective evidence “indicating that the questionnaires 
misrepresent[ed] the putative class members’ intent” nor “argued that 
the questionnaire responses [were] not authentic.”133 
 To establish that the questionnaires “misrepresent[ed] the 
putative class members’ intent” as a whole, the defendant argued that 
the sample of questionnaire responses contained an abnormally high 
proportion of state citizens because the post office had stopped 
forwarding mail to persons forced out of the state.134 This allegedly 
implied that a smaller percentage of out-of-state class members would 
receive and respond to the questionnaires than remaining state 
residents, and presumably, it was less likely that class members forced 
out of the state intended to return and remain in the state.135  
                                                                                                                   
move persons off its premises in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and the failure of 
LAFON to provide adequate medical care in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.” Id. at 
270. 
130 Id. at 280.  
131 Id. at 273. 
132 Id. at 273–74. 
133 Id. at 276.  
134 Id. 
135 See id. The defendant’s argument used the same reasoning accepted by the 
court in Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., where the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
sample evidence of citizenship showing that 93.8% of a class of (1) property owners 
and (2) non-property owners injured by the defendants’ toxic substances were 
residents of the state. 449 F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2006). The plaintiffs did not 
indicate the composition of property owners versus non-property owners in the 
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 The district court dismissed the defendant’s argument, finding 
that “[t]he fact that not all potential class members responded” did not 
preclude the court from “assum[ing] that these responses [were] 
representative of the class as a whole.”136 More importantly, the court 
cited Preston II and quoted the portion of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
qualifying the extreme circumstances of the Katrina events as reason 
to presume that residents forced out of the state intended to return.137 
 The Preston II and Martin decisions unveil suspicions about 
the actual utility of evidence of domiciliary intent. The events of 
Katrina, while extreme, were no more than a backdrop for the Fifth 
Circuit to apply a presumption of continuing domicile.138 However, a 
presumption of continuing domicile requires that domicile be 
established by class members in the first place, and in Preston II, aside 
from the questionable eight affidavits of domiciliary intent, the only 
evidence that the plaintiffs provided was of residence.139 Indeed, when 
the Preston II court stated that “[e]ven though eight affidavits may 
                                                                                                                   
sample, and property owners were presumably more likely to be domiciliaries of the 
state. Id. 
136 Martin, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 276. However, this particular line of reasoning 
misconstrues the defendant’s argument. The defendant contested the questionnaire 
sample’s composition, not size. See id. at 274. 
137 Id.; see Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston II), 
485 F.3d 804, 817 (5th Cir. 2007). 
138 See Preston II, 485 F.3d at 818 (“[W]e find no precedential support for the 
notion that a forced relocation (especially, a mandatory evacuation prompted by a 
natural disaster) destroys the presumption of continued domicile.”); Denlinger v. 
Brennan, 87 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir.1996) (“[S]ince domicile is a voluntary status, a 
forcible change in a person’s state of residence does not alter his domicile; hence the 
domicile of [a] prisoner before he was imprisoned is presumed to remain his 
domicile while he is in prison. . . . [T]he presumption articulated in Sullivan is 
rebuttable, but on this meager record it has not been rebutted.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted); Fort Knox Transit v. Humphrey, 151 F.2d 602, 602–03 (6th 
Cir.1945) (“[U]pon the whole record and in the absence of any challenge to the 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s residence in Ohio is prima facie evidence of his 
citizenship in that state and is not overthrown by residence in Kentucky as a member 
of the Armed Forces of the United States, and there being no substantial evidence of 
voluntary relinquishment of an Ohio domicile”). 
139 See Preston II, 485 F.3d at 815. 
 108
27
Orellana: Two-Thirds of an Evidentiary Requirement: Are Courts Too Strict i
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
constitute a small number of statements outside the unique 
convergence of facts presented in this case, we find that here, the 
affidavits amplify the court’s carefully reasoned conclusion about the 
probable citizenship of the proposed class,” it appears that the court 
was seeking confirmation to justify its own “guesswork” about the 
probable citizenship of the class, rather than evidence that adequately 
bore on the question of intent in its own right.140  
  
IV. CONSTRUING STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 In discussing the solution of providing evidence of domiciliary 
intent through representative samples, the Seventh Circuit in Nextel 
stated that a level of statistical significance “greater than [fifty] percent 
would have allowed the district court to conclude that the plaintiffs 
had established the citizenship requirement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”141 This level of statistical significance is admittedly less 
than the 95% level normally required by scientists and statisticians.142 
Indeed, this standard merely requires the fact-finder to believe that the 
alleged hypothesis is “more likely than not” and “inherently, it allows 
the fact-finder to assess risks, to measure probabilities, [and] to make 
subjective judgments.”143  
 However, the obscure notion of statistical significance has 
generated much confusion in courts and its application to evidence 
standards.144 For example, statisticians employ different standards for 
                                                 
140 See id. at 818 (emphasis added). 
141 In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing the acceptable 
probability of error for evidence in great detail)). 
142 Id. (“Statisticians and scientists usually want at least 95% certainty”); Ethyl 
Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 n.58 (“Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence unless 
the probability of error, by standard statistical measurement, is less than 5%. That is, 
scientific fact is at least 95% certain.”). 
143 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 n.58 (emphasis added).   
 109
144 Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice 
Standard of Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 821, 839–40 (2002).   
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accepting Type II errors from Type I errors in their studies.145 A Type 
I error occurs when a study mistakenly rejects the null hypothesis (the 
hypothesis against which the statistician seeks to provide evidence, in 
order to prove the alternative hypothesis).146 A Type II error occurs 
when a study mistakenly accepts the null hypothesis.147 By 
convention, statisticians accept a Type II error rate of 20% and a Type 
I error rate of 5%.148 Here, if a plaintiff were trying to prove that two-
thirds of the proposed class members are citizens of the state, the null 
hypothesis would (roughly) be that the evidence that the plaintiff 
provided does not establish citizenship. Hence, were a statistician to 
act in accord with convention, he or she would accept data more likely 
to disprove the plaintiff’s claim than to support it (i.e., accepting a 
higher rate of Type II error than Type I error).149 Why should the 
plaintiff, who already bears the burden of showing citizenship of the 
class, be further hamstringed by statistical conventions? 
 Moreover, interpretation of the P-value (on which statistical 
significance is based) is often a mystery in courts, because the P-value 
does not say anything about causation.150 Rather, the calculated P-
value indicates the probability that the sample data would result if the 
null hypothesis were true.151 For example, imagine that plaintiffs 
provided data indicating that 67% of a sample of class members, who 
are residents of and owned property in the state, are also citizens of the 
state. The null hypothesis might be that residence and in-state property 
ownership of members in this class correlate with citizenship at a rate 
less than 67% (i.e., insufficient to establish citizenship of the class), 
while the alternative hypothesis would be that residence and property 
ownership correlate with citizenship at least 67% of the time (i.e., 
                                                 
145 Id. at 840. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 840 n.54. 
149 See id. at 840 & n.54. 
150 Id. at 842.  
151 D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 1333, 1342 (1986). 
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sufficient to establish citizenship of the class). If a statistician, trying 
to determine whether this sample was truly representative of the class 
as a whole, calculates a P-value of 0.49 for the study, that means there 
is a 49% chance that the plaintiffs’ sampling of class members would 
have selected citizens at the rate of 67%, even if less than 67% of the 
total class members were actually citizens of the state (i.e., if the null 
hypothesis were true).152 To calculate statistical significance, the 
statistician then easily computes the confidence coefficient, which is 
simply one minus the P-value (here, 0.51).153 This implies that there is 
a 51% chance that the plaintiffs’ sampling of class members would 
have selected a group composed of 67% citizens in a world where at 
least 67% of those class members with residency and owning property 
were actually citizens of the state (i.e., if the alternative hypothesis 
were true).154  
 However, statistical significance does not establish confidence 
in the hypothesis test itself and the parameters upon which it rests.155 
This issue is exacerbated by the ability of plaintiffs to tailor the variety 
of available statistical methods to their own goals.156 For instance, a 
manipulative statistician could take a large sample of data and select 
favorable portions to create a smaller tailored sample demonstrating 
what his party seeks to prove.157 Of course, the statistician would have 
to account for the fact that a decrease in sample size also decreases the 
statistical significance of the test.158  
                                                 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 1339 (indicating that a P-value of 0.51 is not sufficient to deem 
the study statistically significant at the 0.05 level, because the P-value is less than 
0.95). 
154 See id. at 1342. 
155 Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title 
VII Litigation: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
455, 467 (1990). 
156 Id. at 461. 
157 See Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(doubting genuineness of the plaintiff’s sample because the method for selecting 
persons in the representative sample was not disclosed). 
158 See Garaud, supra note 155, at 462. 
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Moreover, the required reliability of sample evidence to 
establish citizenship is diminished in the context of the two-thirds 
requirement of the CAFA home-state and local controversy 
exceptions. For instance, consider a sample plaintiff class, exactly 
meeting the two-thirds citizenship requirement: there is a two-thirds 
(66.6%) chance that any single randomly selected member of this class 
is a citizen of the state. This is a logically diminished burden in 
contrast to the usual situation in diversity jurisdiction disputes where 
the citizenship of all (100%) individual parties must be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  
 Overall, it is not clear that statistical evidence from a 
representative sample offers substantial benefits to the court in 
determining citizenship of a class. As discussed above, the potential 
for manipulation of sample data and for court and jury 
misinterpretation are far too great to justify the costs of obtaining 
experts and collecting data, especially in the face of an 
unconventionally low required significance level of merely 51% for 
proving that two-thirds of the members of a class are citizens of the 
state. The potential for confusion is exacerbated because courts often 
use their own intuitions, instead of referring to statistics experts, to 
estimate the probative value of plaintiffs’ evidence.159 What 
objectivity is actually gained if courts still use their own unqualified, 
subjective intuitions to evaluate the probative value of these sample 
studies?  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to require plaintiffs to submit 
evidence of domiciliary intent, or to limit class definitions to include 
only citizens of the state, has severely hampered the ability of 
plaintiffs to utilize the class action device at the state level. On the one 
hand, providing such evidence likely entails locating unknown class 
                                                 
159 See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston II), 485 
F.3d 804, 816 (5th Cir. 2007); Evans, 449 F.3d at 1166; Martin v. Lafon Nursing 
Facility of the Holy Family, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 268, 276 (E.D. La. 2008). 
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members for response to questionnaires, and providing such evidence 
can be unduly expensive. If courts wish to objectively and fairly 
evaluate such representative samples, they must utilize experts to 
evaluate the statistical implications of these studies, driving the costs 
of litigation even further up, and diminishing plaintiffs’ potential for 
recovery. On the other hand, if courts do not utilize experts, the lack of 
judicial expertise on statistical matters, the potential for confusion and 
misinterpretation, and the ability of parties to manipulate and produce 
biased results implicates the concerns of unreliability caused by 
subjective judgments and “guesswork” estimations that the Seventh 
Circuit sought to avoid by requiring evidence in the first place. 
Moreover, requiring plaintiffs to define their class in terms of 
citizenship as an economically feasible alternative deprives non-
citizens of the remedies available to citizen class members who were 
similarly wronged. Lastly, reliance on old principles of proving 
domicile, while relevant, should not be imported wholesale into the 
context of CAFA class action jurisdiction, where the citizenship of 
class members need not be shown. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
should adopt a presumption of domicile where the class is defined to 
include only residents, especially since a defendant’s burden under 
CAFA for showing diversity is so easily met under the minimal 
diversity standard. By failing to adopt a rebuttable presumption of 
domicile, the Seventh Circuit has undermined the principles of 
practicality, reasonableness, and judicial economy that the class action 
was intended to promote. 
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